Researchers, funders, universities and governments must work together to build scientific collaborations that are resilient to changing geopolitics

Protecting science from sanctions

Researchers, funders, universities and governments must work together to build scientific collaborations that are resilient to changing geopolitics

Pressing challenges, from the climate emergency to pandemic preparedness, demand concerted efforts at the global scale. But the growth in the use of international sanctions since the Second World War¹, although mostly targeted at economic growth and military capacity, has also affected science and scientific cooperation (see ‘Science, restricted’ and Supplementary information for raw data). Many nations have suspended publicly funded collaborations with the scientific institutions of several countries, including Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Even when they don’t target science specifically, sanctions hinder cross-border collaborations by increasing bureaucracy, restricting exports of equipment and financial transactions, as well as skewing where research is done². Sanctions can also evolve rapidly, and changes in international relations can be hard to foresee, making long-term projects — such as the monitoring of changes in climate and ecosystems — difficult to sustain.

As academics focused on environmental hazards and science diplomacy, we outline five ways to help develop and maintain scientific collaborations in a world that is fragmenting geopolitically. We urge researchers, national academies, funders, universities, governments and intergovernmental agencies to work together to ensure that, when governments decide to deploy sanctions, the impact they might have on science is fully considered.

Source: **www.globalsanctionsdatabase.com**

Sanctions stymie science

Within four days of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia more than three years ago, the International Science Council in Paris — although emphasizing that the impacts on Ukrainian scientists were the largest concern — was warning that measures against Russia could have important implications for Arctic research. This turned out to be true.

The sanctions imposed on Russia have led to gaps in data underpinning global climate models³. Russia is the fourth-biggest emitter of carbon dioxide, and the country includes more than half of the Arctic coastline, making it one of the most important locations for monitoring changes in the climate. Funding and access restrictions mean that many Arctic data sets, such as those on wildfires, permafrost and animal migrations, are not being recorded. And even when data are collected by Russian scientists, they are often not shared with the wider community.

As a result, many researchers are pivoting to other areas of the Arctic, such as Canada or Greenland. But this change in coverage leads to biases in the data available and limits the ability of scientists to observe environmental change³. For example, the International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic (INTERACT), a European Union-funded project, has lost access to data from 21 Russian monitoring stations (out of a total of 94 in the region).

Other fields are also affected⁴. In astronomy, for example, eROSITA, a German–Russian satellite observing black holes, was switched off in 2022, and CERN, Europe’s particle-physics laboratory near Geneva, Switzerland, has halted collaboration with most Russian institutions.

Lessons from North Korea

North Korea is another case in point. One of us (J.O.S.H.) has been working for 14 years with Earth scientists there — and saw at first hand how hard it can be to engage in research amid rapidly changing geopolitics and an evolving sanctions regime.

From 2002 to 2005, Mount Paektu, a volcano on the border of North Korea and China (where it is known as Mount Changbai) showed signs of activity. It was responsible for one of the largest eruptions in human history⁵ in ad 946. In 2011, North Korean scientists invited J.O.S.H. and volcanologist Clive Oppenheimer at the University of Cambridge, UK, to visit and discuss the volcano’s unrest. Funds were sourced from the Richard Lounsbery Foundation in Washington DC, which focuses on science diplomacy.

Many hurdles had to be overcome just to start the project. UK universities were reluctant to sign agreements with their North Korean counterparts, and it was hard to find out how to conduct financial transactions with and export equipment to North Korea. Help came from the UK Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, both advocates for science diplomacy (see ‘The different facets of science diplomacy’).

The different facets of science diplomacy

The interaction between science and diplomacy has historically encompassed three aspects.

Science for diplomacy is the use of science to improve international relations. Scientific engagement can help to build trust and understanding between countries; for example, work by one of us (J.O.S.H.) in North Korea represents the only active bilateral project between the United Kingdom and North Korea today. Collaboration in health and environmental matters was the focus of science-diplomacy engagement between the United States and Cuba, starting in 2014 (ref. 7).

Then there is diplomacy for science, in which diplomats help to facilitate scientific projects by developing funding schemes, such as Horizon Europe, or by ensuring that scientific projects can be maintained when sanctions are imposed, such as those affecting North Korea.

Finally, there is science in diplomacy, the use of scientific advice to underpin foreign policy. For example, government science advisers in foreign ministries can embed scientific evidence in foreign-policy decisions on topics ranging from climate-change mitigation to protecting access to sensitive research (see go.nature.com/3jcvmrd).

In practice, none of these is easy⁸. Science diplomacy is entwined with national interests, and science can, at times, be used ‘transactionally’ as part of wider negotiations⁹ or as a stick to achieve foreign-policy goals (see go.nature.com/45phmqk). The use of sanctions, in particular those that specifically target science, is one clear example. This led the UK Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science to update their language: the more nuanced ‘diplomacy impacting science’ replaces ‘diplomacy for science’, to recognize that diplomacy can harm as well as help scientific collaboration.

In 2012, the Royal Society signed agreements with North Korean and Chinese organizations on the researchers’ behalf, and the institutions helped to communicate the importance of the project to the UK and US governments.

UK policy towards North Korea is one of ‘critical engagement’. It condemns North Korea’s weapons-development programme, arms transfers and human-rights record, for example, but seeks to engage with North Korea in areas of mutual interest that can facilitate continued and consistent collaboration. In 2013, the UK and US governments decided that studying Mount Paektu would not violate the spirit of the sanctions. This offered a chance to engage in the science of a potentially large volcanic eruption, of clear interest for all sides.

Even so, the collaboration was challenging to develop. For example, the UK government refused an export licence for induction coils, sensitive magnetometers that could also be used to detect submarines. The decision was a setback for a planned measurement of subsurface electrical conductivity, and the project had to be modified to a purely seismological one. In July 2013, J.O.S.H. was allowed to travel to North Korea with six seismometers and began two years of geological and geophysical fieldwork.

Diplomatic support helped to bring UK volcanologists to Mount Paektu in North Korea.Credit: Clive Oppenheimer

However, a difficult situation arose after North Korea’s nuclear test on 9 September 2016. A United Nations Security Council resolution explicitly forbade scientific collaboration with the North Korean state. This was just after the project’s first publication, which was led by North Korean scientists⁶, and an international conference hosted in Pyongyang designed to develop further studies of the volcano. These more-ambitious projects seemed doomed never to start.

But the resolution had two caveats: it exempted medical exchanges from the sanctions, and it gave UN member states leeway to review scientific activity with North Korea and contact the Security Council when projects did not violate the sanctions. With the UK government’s support, the second approach allowed the volcanology research to continue — which it does to this day.

Protect science and scientists

The North Korean example shows that, with careful development, key scientific efforts can be maintained, even in the face of blanket sanctions. Collaborations with Russia continue where legal obligations demand it, when stopping the project would harm national interests, and in areas of science built around large infrastructure. For example, Russia is a founding member of ITER, the organization behind the nuclear-fusion reactor being built in France, and the Russian space agency is one of the operators of the International Space Station. And although CERN has decided to expel most Russian scientists unless they find new affiliations outside Russia, it maintains some collaborations with researchers at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, north of Moscow.